home
***
CD-ROM
|
disk
|
FTP
|
other
***
search
/
Shareware Overload Trio 2
/
Shareware Overload Trio Volume 2 (Chestnut CD-ROM).ISO
/
dir33
/
cwru_ct.zip
/
91-155.ZS
< prev
next >
Wrap
Text File
|
1993-11-06
|
6KB
|
99 lines
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA
CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. et al. v. LEE, SUPERIN-
TENDENT OF PORT AUTHORITY POLICE
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit
No. 91-155. Argued March 25, 1992-Decided June 26, 1992
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which owns and
operates three major airports in the New York City area and controls
certain terminal areas at the airports (hereinafter terminals), adopted
a regulation forbidding, inter alia, the repetitive solicitation of money
within the terminals. However, solicitation is permitted on the
sidewalks outside the terminal buildings. Petitioner International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., a not-for-profit religious
corporation whose members, among other things, solicit funds in
public places to support their movement, brought suit seeking declar-
atory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the
regulation deprived them of their First Amendment rights. The
District Court granted petitioner summary judgment, concluding that
the terminals were public fora, and that the regulation banning
solicitation failed because it was not narrowly tailored to support a
compelling state interest. The Court of Appeals reversed as here
relevant. It determined that the terminals are not public fora, and
found that the ban on solicitation was reasonable.
Held:
1.An airport terminal operated by a public authority is a non-
public forum, and thus a ban on solicitation need only satisfy a
reasonableness standard. Pp.4-10.
(a)The extent to which the Port Authority can restrict expres-
sive activity on its property depends on the nature of the forum.
Regulation of traditional public fora or designated public fora sur-
vives only if it is narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state
interest, but limitations on expressive activity conducted on any other
government-owned property need only be reasonable to survive.
Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37,
45, 46. Pp.4-5.
(b)Neither by tradition nor purpose can the terminals be de-
scribed as public fora. Airports have not historically been made
available for speech activity. Given the lateness with which the
modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies as
a property that has ``immemorially . . . time out of mind'' been held
in the public trust and used for the purposes of expressive activity.
See Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496,
515. Nor have airport operators opened terminals to such activities,
see Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 802, as evidenced by the operators' frequent and continu-
ing litigation in this area. Pp.6-7.
(c)That speech activities may have historically occurred at
``transportation nodes'' such as rail and bus stations, wharves, and
Ellis Island is not relevant. Many of these sites traditionally have
had private ownership. In addition, equating airports with other
transportation centers would not take into account differences among
the various facilities that may affect the extent to which such facili-
ties can accommodate expressive activity. It is unsurprising to find
differences among the facilities. The Port Authority, other airport
builders and managers, and the Federal Government all share the
view that terminals are dedicated to the facilitation of efficient air
travel, not the solicitation of contributions. Pp.7-10.
2.The Port Authority's ban on solicitation is reasonable. Solicita-
tion may have a disruptive effect on business by slowing the path of
both those who must decide whether to contribute and those who
must alter their paths to avoid the solicitation. In addition, a
solicitor may cause duress by targeting the most vulnerable persons
or commit fraud by concealing his affiliation or shortchanging pur-
chasers. The fact that the targets are likely to be on a tight sched-
ule, and thus are unlikely to stop and complain to authorities,
compounds the problem. The Port Authority has determined that it
can best achieve its legitimate interest in monitoring solicitation
activity to assure that travelers are not interfered with unduly by
limiting solicitation to the sidewalk areas outside the terminals.
That area is frequented by an overwhelming percentage of airport
users, making petitioner's access to the general public quite complete.
Moreover, it would be odd to conclude that the regulation is unrea-
sonable when the Port Authority has otherwise assured access to a
universally travelled area. While the inconvenience caused by
petitioner may seem small, the Port Authority could reasonably worry
that the incremental effects of having one group and then another
seek such access could prove quite disruptive. Pp.10-12.
925 F.2d 576, affirmed in part.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., filed a
concurring opinion. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, in Part I of which Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, JJ.,
joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and
Stevens, JJ., joined.